Integrated Safety Management is a concept that is being actively promoted by the U.S. Department of Energy as a means of assuring safe operation of its facilities. The concept involves the integration of safety precepts into work planning rather than adjusting for safe operations after defining the work activity. The system engineering techniques used to design an integrated safety management system for a high consequence research facility are described. An example is given to show how the concepts evolved with the system design.
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BACKGROUND
System Boundary. Integrated Safety Management (ISM) at Lawrence Livermore National laboratory (LLNL) is managed at two levels. The site level safety system describes the institutional safety management functions that apply to the Laboratory as a whole. Facility, activity and task safety management is managed at the facility level. Figure  1 , below shows the relationship between site, facility, activity and task activities. Objectives. The Defense Technology Engineering Division's Systems Engineering Center at LLNL was asked to look at ISM requirements as they pertain to high consequence facilities. The goal of the effort was to develop a system that would increase work efficiency and assure regulatory compliance while providing appropriate levels of protection to workers, the public and the environment.
Regulatory Environment.
There is a complex regulatory environment that ultimately drives the safety environment.
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs) establish some safety requirements that are directly applicable to LLNL. Other CFRs drive the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulations (DEARS) which, in turn, drive contract requirements for Integrated Safety Management. The Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) is chartered by the U.S. Congress to provide nuclear safety oversight of Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. The DNFSB role is similar to the role played by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for civilian nuclear facilities. The DNFSB has developed its own set of ISM guidance documents.
CONCEPTS
At the beginning of the project, the customer expressed the desire that we incorporate three operational concepts into any Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS).
Work and Safety Envelopes.
Research and Development (R&D) involving hazardous material requires a careful balance between safety controls and operational flexibility.
Experience has shown that a well defined work envelope inside a well defined safety envelope will allow the flexibility desired by researchers while maintaining safety conditions.
As shown in Figure 2 below, the challenge is to properly define and assure that the work envelope stays within a correctly defined safety envelope. R&D efforts are requiring increasingly complex facilities and apparatus to complete their research objectives. Increasing complexity increases the time needed to develop new experiments and to get those experiments approved. There is also a tendency for each experimenter to re-invent the approval process for each new experiment. There was a general belief that standard approval processes could be used to lower the approval threshold and reduce the time to complete experiments. Structured Work Procedures. In any hazardous operation there is a tradeoff between the skill of the worker and the specificity of work procedures. Production environments will often use a strategy of developing highly specific work procedures and using less skilled workers to follow the detailed procedures. A nuclear reactor is an example of such an environment.
The demolition industry uses highly trained explosives handlers and relatively simple written procedures. In an R&D environment it is desirable to rely upon the skill of the worker, but it is also necessary to be able to demonstrate that the workers are trained for the work that they are being asked to accomplish. The approach to determining how to do work safely while satisfying the objective of integrating work planning with worker, public and environmental protection required the identification of the functions that would have to be performed to define the work. This analysis determined the work objectives, defined the work to be performed, analyzed the hazards, identified the constraints applicable for those hazards, and then established the controls that would mitigate the hazards. There was also a recognition that there needed to be some process monitoring and oversight that would allow for adjustment for changes. Having this in place would allow work to be performed safely. The systems engineering analysis for an integrated safety management system paralleled the functions for the ISMS. The ISMS had the functional flow of: (Mar, 1994; Grygiel, 1994, Mar and Morais, 1997) for developing definition for an integrated system. That methodology took the top level function, that is -what has to be done and in this case -Do Work Safely. The requirements for how well this function must be performed are-Meet The Orders and Regulations and Meet The Work Task Needs. The answer, in this case, was a Facility Integrated Management System (ISMS), and was mandated by the orders and regulations.
The Facility ISMS recognized that there was a larger system that this system was a part of and that this system would have to be meet the larger system's functionality, requirements and constraints. That larger system was The Site ISMS. The test was -Approval by Management.
After defining the top level FRAT for the system, subsequent decomposition provided further details of the system description. The functional decomposition that is only a part of this system description is shown in the following figure Operational Concepts. Another methodology was also used in this analysis. An operational concept definition was also developed for each of the FRAT descriptions. This approach was in recognition that the culture of the organization would be more receptive if there were guidelines that explained the rationale for the functions, requirements, the selected answer, and the tests that were part of the system definition for the ISMS.
These operational concepts also provided part of the decision criteria that helped to select the answers that would perform the functions and meet the requirements. In these descriptions, identified with an "CS', the roles and responsibilities as well as authority were defined. An example of this is shown in Figure 6 and the text that follows. Level 0 of the FRAT hierarchy; set the top level expectations for the ISMS: DO WORK SAFELY (F) Accomplish work safely in facilities that perform High Consequence Operations. High Consequence Operations are those that have the potential to threaten the safety of the workers, the public or the environment. This work shall be within the safety envelope for the LLNL Site and shall meet the requirements of the Site ISMS that have been established for a Facility and that protects the public, the workers and the environment for all work process activities MEET REGULATIONS (R) Structure the tasks to meet DOE requirements as defined in the LLNL contract and statutes and regulations established by National, State and Local agencies as applicable to the facility.
MEET TASK NEEDS (R)
Meet the requirements established by the researchers and engineers for the tasks that have to be accomplished to satisfy the research objectives. HIGH CONSEQUENCE OPERATIONS(O) High consequence operations are tasks that have a plausible possibility of causing significant damage to a worker, the public, the facility or the environment in the event of an accident. LINE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY(O) Line management is responsible for ensuring that work is performed safely. At LLNL, Engineering is responsible for doing work safely, Programs are responsible for what work is performed. CLEAR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES(O) Clear and unambiguous lines of authority and responsibility are defined for all organizational levels. A facility may be operated on one of three modes: landlord/tenant, line, or matrix. A landlord/tenant facility will have a strong (landlord) facility organization that is responsible for safety of the facility and the (tenant) operations within the facility.
The landlord organization approves all activities within the facility. A line facility has one organizational structure that is responsible for both the facility and the operations within the facility. A matrix facility has a split organizational structure with responsibility for safety shared among two or more organizations.
Top level management and safety functions are the same for each type of facility, however the authority and accountability paths are different. COMPETENCE COMMENSURATE WITH RESPONSIBILITIES(O) Personnel possess the experience, knowledge, skills, and abilities that are necessary to discharge their responsibilities.
FACILITY ISMS (A)
A facility oriented safety management system was selected as the choice over the continuation of the current approaches that have been followed. This management system will emphasize worker, public and environmental safety in an integrated approach with the work planning. APPROVAL OF FACILITY ISMS (T) Obtain approval of the Facility Integrated Safety Management System by LLNL management.
EVOLUTION OF SYSTEM CONCEPTS
It is interesting to note the evolution of system concepts that took place during the course of the project. At the beginning of the project it became clear that there was a great deal of similarity between the ISM "cycle" and any self-correcting feedback control system.
Figure 8. EMS Cycle
The user community quickly pointed out a accurate design yielded the diagram in figure 9 that fundamental flaw in the ISMS cycle as contained in could still be mapped back to the original the driver documents. If taken literally, the feedback requirements. only occurs after the work has been done. A more Establish Figure 9 . "Improved" EMS Cycle
The "improved" diagram included functions to "Integrate Safety and Work Planning" and to "Define Safety Requirements".
The diagram in figure 10 shows a process that begins to look more like a control system Work Site Specific H Standards Process Improvement + f + Figure 10 .
EMS With Feedback
The final evolution of the ISMS was achieved when it was realized that work planning and safety planning are mirror images of each other. Work and safety planning needed to function in a coordinated way in order to achieve the goals set forth at the beginning of the project. Figure 11 shows the balanced ISMS. In the figure below, Program and Project Requirements form the basis for analyzing work processes and defining operational constraints.
Site and Facility Requirements form the basis for analyzing hazards and defining safety constraints. 
